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An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple Objects

The American economic review, 2004-12, Vol.94 (5), p.1452-1475 [Peer Reviewed Journal]

Copyright 2004 American Economic Association ;Copyright American Economic Association Dec 2004 ;ISSN: 0002-8282 ;EISSN: 1944-7981 ;DOI: 10.1257/0002828043052330 ;CODEN: AENRAA

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  • Title:
    An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple Objects
  • Author: Ausubel, Lawrence M.
  • Subjects: Auctioneers ; Auctions ; Bidding ; Bids ; Demand curves ; Dynamic efficiency ; Economic theory ; Economics ; Efficiency ; Game theory ; Hypotheses ; Integers ; Marginal value ; Nash equilibrium ; Price efficiency ; Studies
  • Is Part Of: The American economic review, 2004-12, Vol.94 (5), p.1452-1475
  • Description: When bidders exhibit multi-unit demands, standard auction methods generally yield inefficient outcomes. This article proposes a new ascending-bid auction for homogeneous goods, such as Treasury bills or telecommunications spectrum. The auctioneer announces a price and bidders respond with quantities. Items are awarded at the current price whenever they are "clinched," and the price is incremented until the market clears. With private values, this (dynamic) auction yields the same outcome as the (sealed-bid) Vickrey auction, but has advantages of simplicity and privacy preservation. With interdependent values, this auction may retain efficiency, whereas the Vickrey auction suffers from a generalized Winner's Curse.
  • Publisher: Nashville: American Economic Association
  • Language: English
  • Identifier: ISSN: 0002-8282
    EISSN: 1944-7981
    DOI: 10.1257/0002828043052330
    CODEN: AENRAA
  • Source: ProQuest Central

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