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Justified representation in approval-based committee voting

Social choice and welfare, 2017-02, Vol.48 (2), p.461-485 [Peer Reviewed Journal]

Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2017 ;Social Choice and Welfare is a copyright of Springer, 2016. ;ISSN: 0176-1714 ;EISSN: 1432-217X ;DOI: 10.1007/s00355-016-1019-3

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Title:
Justified representation in approval-based committee voting
Author: Aziz, Haris ; Brill, Markus ; Conitzer, Vincent ; Elkind, Edith ; Freeman, Rupert ; Walsh, Toby
Subjects: Approval ; Ballots ; Candidates ; Committees ; Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods ; Economics ; Economics and Finance ; Elections ; Game Theory ; International Political Economy ; Original Paper ; Property ; Public Finance ; Representation ; Social and Behav. Sciences ; Social classes ; Social Policy ; Stability ; Studies ; Voter behavior ; Voters ; Voting rules
Is Part Of: Social choice and welfare, 2017-02, Vol.48 (2), p.461-485
Description: We consider approval-based committee voting, i.e. the setting where each voter approves a subset of candidates, and these votes are then used to select a fixed-size set of winners (committee). We propose a natural axiom for this setting, which we call justified representation (JR). This axiom requires that if a large enough group of voters exhibits agreement by supporting the same candidate, then at least one voter in this group has an approved candidate in the winning committee. We show that for every list of ballots it is possible to select a committee that provides JR. However, it turns out that several prominent approval-based voting rules may fail to output such a committee. In particular, while Proportional Approval Voting (PAV) always outputs a committee that provides JR, Sequential Proportional Approval Voting (SeqPAV), which is a tractable approximation to PAV, does not have this property. We then introduce a stronger version of the JR axiom, which we call extended justified representation (EJR), and show that PAV satisfies EJR, while other rules we consider do not; indeed, EJR can be used to characterize PAV within the class of weighted PAV rules. We also consider several other questions related to JR and EJR, including the relationship between JR/EJR and core stability, and the complexity of the associated computational problems.
Publisher: Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer
Language: English
Identifier: ISSN: 0176-1714
EISSN: 1432-217X
DOI: 10.1007/s00355-016-1019-3
Source: ProQuest One Psychology
AUTh Library subscriptions: ProQuest Central

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Justified representation in approval-based committee voting

Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2017 ;Social Choice and Welfare is a copyright of Springer, 2016. ;ISSN: 0176-1714 ;EISSN: 1432-217X ;DOI: 10.1007/s00355-016-1019-3

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