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How Do We Understand the Meaning of a Sentence Under the Yogācāra Model of the Mind? On Disputes Among East Asian Yogācāra Thinkers of the Seventh Century

Journal of Indian philosophy, 2018-07, Vol.46 (3), p.475-504 [Peer Reviewed Journal]

Springer Nature B.V. 2018 ;Springer Science+Business Media B.V., part of Springer Nature 2018 ;Journal of Indian Philosophy is a copyright of Springer, (2018). All Rights Reserved. ;ISSN: 0022-1791 ;EISSN: 1573-0395 ;DOI: 10.1007/s10781-017-9343-1

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  • Title:
    How Do We Understand the Meaning of a Sentence Under the Yogācāra Model of the Mind? On Disputes Among East Asian Yogācāra Thinkers of the Seventh Century
  • Author: Keng, Ching
  • Subjects: Buddhism ; Buddhists ; Characters ; Chinese languages ; Cognition & reasoning ; Consciousness ; Discourse analysis ; Disputes ; Education ; Grammar ; Meaning ; Non-Western Philosophy ; Philosophy ; Philosophy of Religion ; Religious Studies ; Sentence structure ; Syntactic structures ; Understanding ; Word meaning
  • Is Part Of: Journal of Indian philosophy, 2018-07, Vol.46 (3), p.475-504
  • Description: Understanding the meaning of a sentence is crucial for Buddhists because they put so much emphasis on understanding the verbal expressions of the Buddha. But this can be problematic under their metaphysical framework of momentariness, and their epistemological framework of multiple consciousnesses. This paper starts by reviewing the theory of five states of mind in the Yogācārabhūmi, and then investigates debates among medieval East Asian Yogācāra thinkers about how various consciousnesses work together to understand the meaning of a sentence. The major differences between the various explanations proffered lie in the minimum number of types of consciousnesses involved, and the minimum linguistic marks (sound, syllable, term, sentence and meaning) cognized, in order for one to understand a sentence consisting of four Chinese characters. I show that in these disputes, two points are key: First, the role played by the mental consciousness that arises simultaneously with a sensory consciousness: that is to say, whether a sensory consciousness should still be regarded as essential for understanding, if the simultaneous mental consciousness also cognizes the same mark. Second, whether the syntactic structure of a sentence is taken into consideration: that is to say, whether there is a separate determination of understanding regarding each character, or there is no determination until one has heard two or more characters and takes them as a syntactically meaningful unit.
  • Publisher: Dordrecht: Springer
  • Language: English
  • Identifier: ISSN: 0022-1791
    EISSN: 1573-0395
    DOI: 10.1007/s10781-017-9343-1
  • Source: ProQuest Central

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