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Speaking of the short-term: disclosure horizon and managerial myopia

Review of accounting studies, 2015-09, Vol.20 (3), p.1122-1163 [Peer Reviewed Journal]

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Title:
Speaking of the short-term: disclosure horizon and managerial myopia
Author: Brochet, Francois ; Loumioti, Maria ; Serafeim, George
Subjects: Accounting/Auditing ; Benchmarks ; Business and Management ; Business communications ; Capital markets ; Corporate Finance ; Disclosure ; Earnings management ; Executive compensation ; Investments ; Monetary incentives ; Moral hazard ; Public Finance ; R&D ; Research & development ; Studies
Is Part Of: Review of accounting studies, 2015-09, Vol.20 (3), p.1122-1163
Description: We study conference calls as a voluntary disclosure channel and create a proxy for the time horizon that senior executives emphasize in their communications. We find that our measure of disclosure time horizon is associated with capital market pressures and executives’ short-term monetary incentives. Consistent with the language emphasized during conference calls partially capturing short-termism, we show that our proxy is associated with earnings and real activities management. Overall, the results show that the time horizon of conference call narratives can be informative about managers’ myopic behavior.
Publisher: New York: Springer US
Language: English
Identifier: ISSN: 1380-6653
EISSN: 1573-7136
DOI: 10.1007/s11142-015-9329-8
Source: ProQuest Central

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