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Corporate Governance and Earnings Quality in China
DOI: 10.17169/refubium-27340
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Title:
Corporate Governance and Earnings Quality in China
Author:
Xie, Dongfeng
Subjects:
ddc:330
;
ddc:334
;
Earnings Management
;
Gender Bias
;
Gender Diversity
;
Internal Control Weakness
;
International Experience
Description:
The present thesis “Corporate Governance and Earnings Quality in China” investigates different factors affecting earnings quality of listed firms in the Chinese stock markets. It extends the prior research on the way of attempting to find out which elements do generate a significant effect on earnings quality. The first paper “CEO’s International Experience and Earnings Management: Evidence from Chinese Listed Firms” attempts to confirm whether CEO’s international study and work experience brings a brain gain into the improvement of earnings quality, commonly measured by less earnings management. By gathering and analyzing a dataset from 2010 to 2014 on all the listed firms in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets, no evidence is found to support a correlation between CEO’s international experience and earnings management, no matter if earnings management is measured by discretionary accruals, meeting or beating analysts’ earnings forecasts or conditional conservatism. However, after dividing the whole sample into subsamples according to different kinds of international experience, it is concluded that CEOs with both international study and work experience try to restrain earnings management through discretionary accruals (Coef.=-0.0164, t-value=-2.39) at a significant level of 5%. Nevertheless, these CEOs with both types of international experience do not intend to meet or beat analysts’ earnings forecasts in an immature stock market, in which imprecise earnings forecasts from analysts lead to no significant response from institutional investors when they are making decisions on investments. Besides, CEOs with international study experience only are less likely to recognize loss timely, an indication of less conditional conservatism. The second paper “Internal Control Weakness and Earnings Quality in China” examines the relation between internal control weakness (ICW) and earnings quality in the main market, which refers to all the stocks in the Shanghai Stock Market and stocks in the Shenzhen Stock Market with an ID’s beginning of 002. The sample is constrained to the main market, because the mandatory disclosure on internal control report (ICR)and internal control auditing report (ICAR) is required only on the main market from the year 2014. By hand-collecting a dataset from 2014 to 2016, I define the moving sum of absolute discretionary accruals (MSDA) as the main measurement for earnings quality, and the more MSDA is, the worse the according earnings quality would be. ICW is defined as a dummy variable which equals to 1 when a firm discloses material and/or important ICWs, and 0 otherwise. As the multivariate analysis shows, the expected negative effect of ICW on earnings quality in prior research is not detected. Alternative robustness tests based on the new measurement of earnings quality, the absolute discretionary accruals (ABSDA) and income smoothing, further confirm the finding. Further, I consider different types of ICWs: Financial ICWs and non-financial ICWs and find no evidence on a relation between both types of ICWs and earnings quality, no matter measured by MSDA or ABSDA. Nevertheless, the non-financial ICWs have a marginally significant and negative effect on income smoothing (T-value=-1.75). In this paper, I also test the effect of the strictness of the standards to identify material ICW on earnings quality. Following Tan et al. (2016), strictness is defined in the range from 0 to 4, and the larger it is, the stricter the standard is set. Results suggest an insignificant relation between strictness and earnings quality, measured by both MSDA and ABSDA. However, a significantly positive relation at a marginal level (T-value=1.74) is found between strictness and income smoothing. The third paper “Board Gender Diversity, Gender Bias and Earnings Management: Evidence from China” examines the effect of board gender diversity and gender bias on earnings management in the listed firms in China. Gender Diversity is measured by the proportion of female directors on the board, a common measure from prior research. Gender Bias is only defined in the special Chinese condition with long-term son preference and decades of one-child policy from the 1980s, which makes the sex ratio at birth (male births per female births) at provincial level an exogenous measure for gender bias. Earnings management is measured by the absolute value of discretionary accruals. A sample of 7704 observations from 2015 to 2017 in the Chinese stock markets is hand-collected and analyzed. Each firm in the sample is allocated with its provincial sex ratio at birth based on the headquarter of the firm. Although we do not find evidence to support a significant effect from board gender diversity on earnings management, gender bias is negatively associated with earnings management at 5% level. However, it is hard to believe that more gender bias is combined with less earnings management. Therefore, we suppose that this link could be indirect and add provincial GDP per capita as an additional independent variable. Gender bias loses its significance, while provincial GDP (T-value=2.52) is significantly and positively correlated with earnings management. A further 2SLS regression suggests that gender bias is significantly and negatively associated with provincial GDP per capita in the first stage and the fitted value of provincial GDP per capita remains positively related to earnings management. This result indicates that listed firms in well-developed provinces tend to engage more in earnings management. Die vorliegende Arbeit „Corporate Governance and Earnings Quality in China“ untersucht, wie unterschiedliche Faktoren Einfluss auf die Finanzberichterstattungsqualität der börsennotierten Aktiengesellschaften des chinesischen Aktienmarktes ausüben. Sie liefert einen Beitrag zu früheren Studien, welche den Einfluss bestimmter Faktoren auf die Finanzberichterstattungsqualität von Unternehmen untersuchen. Die erste Studie „CEO’s International Experience and Earnings Management: Evidence from Chinese Listed Firms“ untersucht, ob die internationale Studien- und Arbeitserfahrung der CEOs der Erhöhung der Finanzberichterstattungsqualität ein brain gain bringt. Die erhöhte Finanzberichterstattungsqualität wird üblicherweise durch weniger Earnings Management gemessen. Durch das Sammeln und die Analysen eines Datensatzes aller börsennotierten Aktiengesellschaften der Aktienmärkte in Shanghai und Shenzhen von 2010 bis 2014 wird kein Beweis für einen Zusammenhang zwischen der internationalen Erfahrung der CEOs und Earnings Management gefunden, egal ob Earnings Management von diskretionären Periodenabgrenzungen, von der Erfüllung oder das Übertreffen der Gewinnprognose der Analysten sowie von bedingt vorsichtiger Bilanzierung bemessen wird. Jedoch ergibt sich die Folgerung, dass CEOs mit beiden Erfahrungen, nämlich, der Studien- und Arbeitserfahrung, versuchen, Earnings Management durch diskretionäre Periodenabgrenzungen (Coef.=-0,0164, t-value=-2,39) zu begrenzen und es ist signifikant auf einem Niveau von 5%, nachdem die Stichprobe nach der unterschiedlichen internationalen Erfahrung geteilt wurde. Trotzdem beabsichtigt diese Gruppe von CEOs mit beiden internationalen Erfahrungen nicht, die Gewinnprognose der Analysten zu erfüllen oder zu übertreffen, da der chinesische Aktienmarkt noch in einer unreifen Phase steht, in der die unpräzisen Gewinnprognosen der Analysten keinen signifikanten Einfluss auf die institutionellen Investoren haben, wenn die institutionellen Investoren eine Investitionsentscheidung treffen möchten. Außerdem sind CEOs mit internationaler Studienerfahrung weniger wahrscheinlich, Verluste zeitgerecht zu verbuchen, d. h. es gibt weniger bedingt vorsichtige Bilanzierung . Die zweite Studie „Internal Control Weakness and Earnings Quality in China“ untersucht den Zusammenhang von internal control weakness (ICW) und Finanzberichterstattungsqualität in main market. Es werden alle Aktiengesellschaften im Shanghai Stock Market und die Aktiengesellschaften, deren IDs Anfang 002 ist, im Shenzhen Stock Market einbezogen. Die Stichprobe beschränkt sich auf das main market, weil nur Aktiengesellschaften vom main market ab dem Jahr 2014verpflichtet sind, die internal control reports (ICR) und die internal control auditing reports (ICAR) zu veröffentlichen. Deswegen ist die Stichprobe von 2014 bis 2016. Das zentrale Maß für die Finanzberichterstattungsqualität ist die moving sum of absolute discretionary accruals (MSDA), und je größer die MSDA ist, umso schlechter wird die entsprechende Finanzberichterstattungsqualität. Der Hauptvariable, ICW, ist als 1 definiert, wenn eine Aktiengesellschaft material und/oder important ICWs veröffentlicht; und 0 sonst. Durch die multivariate Analyse wird der geschätzte negative Einfluss von ICW auf die Finanzberichterstattungsqualität der vorherigen Forschung nicht gefunden. Das Ergebnis der Hauptanalyse wird von alternativen Robustheitstests weiter bestätigt, egal ob die Finanzberichterstattungsqualität von den absoluten diskretionären Periodenabgrenzungen (ABSDA) oder durch income smoothing bemessen wird. Es werden unterschiedliche Typen der ICWs berücksichtigt, namentlich financial ICWs und non-financial ICWs, und es wird kein Hinweis für einen Zusammenhang zwischen beiden Typen der ICWs und der Finanzberichterstattungsqualität gefunden, egal ob die Finanzberichtserstattungsqualität von MSDA oder von ABSDA bemessen wird. Dennoch üben die non-financial ICWs einen schwach signifikanten Einfluss auf income smoothing (T-value=-1,75) aus. Diese Studie beschäftigt sich weiter mit dem Einfluss von der Strenge des Standards zur Identifizierung der material ICWs auf die Finanzberichterstattungsqualität. Die Strenge des Standards wird nach Tan et al. (2016) von 0 bis 4 definiert. Eine größere Ziffer bedeutet einen strengeren Standard. Es ergibt sich einen insignifikanten Zusammenhang zwischen der Strenge des Standa
Creation Date:
2020
Language:
English;German
Identifier:
DOI: 10.17169/refubium-27340
Source:
Refubium
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