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Institutional investors' site visits and investment-cash flow sensitivity: Mitigating financing constraints or inhibiting agent conflicts?

PloS one, 2024-03, Vol.19 (3), p.e0300332-e0300332 [Peer Reviewed Journal]

Copyright: © 2024 Liao et al. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited. ;COPYRIGHT 2024 Public Library of Science ;2024 Liao et al 2024 Liao et al ;ISSN: 1932-6203 ;EISSN: 1932-6203 ;DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0300332 ;PMID: 38547151

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  • Title:
    Institutional investors' site visits and investment-cash flow sensitivity: Mitigating financing constraints or inhibiting agent conflicts?
  • Author: Liao, Jia ; Zhan, Yun ; Yuan, Yu
  • Subjects: Capital market ; Cash flow ; Compensation and benefits ; Corporate governance ; Ecology and Environmental Sciences ; Economic aspects ; Executives ; Financial institutions ; Financial services industry ; Institutional investments ; Investments ; Physical Sciences ; Research and Analysis Methods ; Social Sciences
  • Is Part Of: PloS one, 2024-03, Vol.19 (3), p.e0300332-e0300332
  • Description: Taking Chinese non-financial A-share companies listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) between 2003 and 2018 as a sample, this paper empirically examines whether and how institutional investors' site visits (SVs) affect corporate investment-cash flow sensitivity (ICFS). The results show that institutional investors' SVs can reduce ICFS, and this effect is more obvious for companies with fewer investment opportunities, larger sizes, higher internal cash flows, and higher agency costs, indicating that institutional investors' SVs primarily inhibit ICFS caused by agency conflicts rather than financing constraints. In addition, the inhibitory effect of institutional investors' SVs on ICFS exists mainly in companies with poor internal supervision governance and weak executive compensation incentive mechanisms, indicating that institutional investors' SVs and other forms of corporate governance mechanisms operate as substitutes in reducing ICFS. This paper reveals the important role of institutional investors' SVs in reducing ICFS, with important theoretical and practical implications for regulators to progressively regulate and promote this form of investor activity.
  • Publisher: United States: Public Library of Science
  • Language: English
  • Identifier: ISSN: 1932-6203
    EISSN: 1932-6203
    DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0300332
    PMID: 38547151
  • Source: Public Library of Science (PLoS) Journals Open Access
    Geneva Foundation Free Medical Journals at publisher websites
    PubMed Central
    ProQuest Central
    DOAJ Directory of Open Access Journals

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