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Delayed Expected Loss Recognition and the Risk Profile of Banks

Journal of accounting research, 2015-06, Vol.53 (3), p.511-553 [Peer Reviewed Journal]

2015 The Accounting Research Center at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business ;Copyright ©, University of Chicago on behalf of the Accounting Research Center, 2015 ;ISSN: 0021-8456 ;EISSN: 1475-679X ;DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12079 ;CODEN: JACRBR

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  • Title:
    Delayed Expected Loss Recognition and the Risk Profile of Banks
  • Author: BUSHMAN, ROBERT M. ; WILLIAMS, CHRISTOPHER D.
  • Subjects: Accounting research ; bank ; Banking industry ; Banking system ; Banks ; Capital requirements ; Correlation ; delayed loss recognition ; Equity ; G20 ; G21 ; Liquidity ; loan loss provisions ; Loan losses ; Loss recognition ; M40 ; M41 ; risk ; Risk exposure ; Stock exchange ; Studies ; systemic risk ; transparency
  • Is Part Of: Journal of accounting research, 2015-06, Vol.53 (3), p.511-553
  • Description: This paper investigates the extent to which delayed expected loan loss recognition (DELR) is associated with greater vulnerability of banks to three distinct dimensions of risk: (1) stock market liquidity risk, (2) downside tail risk of individual banks, and (3) codependence of downside tail risk among banks. We hypothesize that DELR increases vulnerability to downside risk by creating expected loss overhangs that threaten future capital adequacy and by degrading bank transparency, which increases financing frictions and opportunities for risk-shifting. We find that DELR is associated with higher correlations between bank-level illiquidity and both aggregate banking sector illiquidity and market returns (i.e., higher liquidity risks) during recessions, suggesting that high DELR banks as a group may simultaneously face elevated financing frictions and enhanced opportunities for risk-shifting behavior in crisis periods. With respect to downside risk, we find that during recessions DELR is associated with significantly higher risk of individual banks suffering severe drops in their equity values, where this association is magnified for banks with low capital levels. Consistent with increased systemic risk, we find that DELR is associated with significantly higher codependence between downside risk of individual banks and downside risk of the banking sector. We theorize that downside risk vulnerability at the individual bank level can translate into systemic risk by virtue of DELR creating a common source of risk vulnerability across high DELR banks simultaneously, which leads to risk codependence among banks and systemic effects from banks acting as part of a herd.
  • Publisher: Chicago: Blackwell Publishing Ltd
  • Language: English
  • Identifier: ISSN: 0021-8456
    EISSN: 1475-679X
    DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12079
    CODEN: JACRBR
  • Source: Alma/SFX Local Collection

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