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Corporate Governance and Agency Conflicts

Journal of accounting research, 2008-12, Vol.46 (5), p.1143-1181 [Peer Reviewed Journal]

Copyright 2008 The Institute of Professional Accounting, University of Chicago ;University of Chicago on behalf of the Institute of Professional Accounting, 2008 ;2008 The Institute of Professional Accounting, University of Chicago ;ISSN: 0021-8456 ;EISSN: 1475-679X ;DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-679X.2008.00301.x ;CODEN: JACRBR

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  • Title:
    Corporate Governance and Agency Conflicts
  • Author: DEY, AIYESHA
  • Subjects: Audit committees ; Business audits ; Business ethics ; Business management ; Business organization ; Business structures ; Business studies ; Chief executive officers ; Cluster analysis ; Conflicts ; Corporate governance ; Executive compensation ; Governance ; Management audits ; Principal-agent theory ; Statistical median ; Studies
  • Is Part Of: Journal of accounting research, 2008-12, Vol.46 (5), p.1143-1181
  • Description: I investigate whether corporate governance is associated with the level of agency conflicts in firms. I employ exploratory principal components analysis on 22 individual governance variables to obtain seven factors that represent the different dimensions of governance for a firm. I measure the level of agency conflicts in firms based on seven proxies for agency conflicts used in the literature. I find that firms with greater agency conflicts have better governance mechanisms in place, particularly those related to the board, audit committee, and auditor. I also find that the composition and functioning of the board, the independence of the auditor, and the equity-based compensation of directors are significantly associated with firm performance, but primarily for firms with high agency conflicts. Overall, the results support the theory that the existence and role of various governance mechanisms in a firm are a function of the level of agency conflicts in the firm.
  • Publisher: Malden, USA: Blackwell Publishing Inc
  • Language: English
  • Identifier: ISSN: 0021-8456
    EISSN: 1475-679X
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-679X.2008.00301.x
    CODEN: JACRBR
  • Source: Alma/SFX Local Collection
    RePEc

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