Ngôn ngữ:

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance

The Yale law journal, 2005-05, Vol.114 (7), p.1521-1611

Copyright 2005 The Yale Law Journal Company, Inc. ;COPYRIGHT 2005 Yale University, School of Law ;Copyright Yale Law Journal Company, Inc. May 2005 ;ISSN: 0044-0094 ;EISSN: 1939-8611

Tài liệu số/Tài liệu điện tử

Trích dẫn Trích dẫn bởi

Gửi đến

Nhan đề:
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance
Tác giả: Romano, Roberta
Chủ đề: American organizations ; American studies ; Audit committees ; Auditing ; Bankruptcy ; Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act 2002-US ; Business audits ; Business practices ; Business structures ; Business studies ; Capital market ; Corporate finance ; Corporate governance ; Corporate regulation ; Disclosure statements (Accounting) ; Economic policy ; Fees ; Financial reporting ; Government mandates ; Laws, regulations and rules ; Legal reform ; Legislation ; Legislative process ; Political aspects ; Political economy ; Public Company Accounting Reform & Investor Protection Act 2002-US ; Regulatory legislation ; Risk ; Sarbanes-Oxley Act ; Scandals ; Securities and Exchange Commission regulation ; State government ; Stock exchange ; U.S.A ; United States Senate
Là 1 phần của: The Yale law journal, 2005-05, Vol.114 (7), p.1521-1611
Mô tả: This Article provides an evaluation of the substantive corporate governance mandates of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002 that is informed by the relevant empirical accounting and finance literature, and of the political dynamics that produced the mandates. The empirical literature provides a metric for evaluating whether specific provisions can be most accurately characterized as efficacious reforms or as quack corporate governance. The learning of the literature, much of which was available when Congress was debating the bill, is that SOX's corporate governance provisions were ill conceived. The political environment explains why Congress would enact legislation with such mismatched means and ends. SOX was enacted as emergency legislation amid a free-falling stock market and media frenzy over corporate scandals shortly before midterm congressional elections. The governance provisions, introduced toward the end of the legislative process in the Senate, were not a focus of any considered attention. Their inclusion stemmed from the interaction between election-year politics and the Senate Banking Committee chairman's response to the suggestions of policy entrepreneurs. The scholarly literature at odds with those individuals' recommendations was not brought to Congress's attention (and was ignored on the rare occasions that it was referenced). The pattern of congressional decisionmaking in SOX is not, however, unique. Much of the expansion of federal regulation offinancial markets has occurred after significant market turmoil. The Article concludes that SOX's corporate governance provisions should be stripped of their mandatory force and rendered optional. To mitigate future policy blunders on the scale of SOX, it also suggests that emergency or crisis-mode legislation provide for reevaluation at a later date when more deliberativ reflection is possible.
Nơi xuất bản: New Haven: The Yale Law Journal Company
Ngôn ngữ: English
Số nhận dạng: ISSN: 0044-0094
EISSN: 1939-8611
Nguồn: Free E Journals
ProQuest Central

Trở lại danh sách kết quả

Trước Kết quả 4 Tiếp theo Tới trang tiếp theo


INSPIRE LIBRARY - TON DUC THANG UNIVERSITY	(84-028) 37 755 057	Feedback
19 Nguyen Huu Tho St. Dist.7, HCM	thuvien@tdtu.edu.vn	Feedback

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance

Copyright 2005 The Yale Law Journal Company, Inc. ;COPYRIGHT 2005 Yale University, School of Law ;Copyright Yale Law Journal Company, Inc. May 2005 ;ISSN: 0044-0094 ;EISSN: 1939-8611

Đang tìm Cơ sở dữ liệu bên ngoài...