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CEO PENSION AND SELLING, GENERAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE COST STICKINESS

International journal of entrepreneurship, 2018-12, Vol.22 (4), p.1-21 [Peer Reviewed Journal]

Copyright Jordan Whitney Enterprises, Inc 2018 ;ISSN: 1099-9264 ;EISSN: 1939-4675

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  • Title:
    CEO PENSION AND SELLING, GENERAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE COST STICKINESS
  • Author: Mo, Kyoungwon ; Park, Kyung Jin ; Kim, YoungJin
  • Subjects: Chief executive officers ; Economic models ; Executive compensation ; Studies
  • Is Part Of: International journal of entrepreneurship, 2018-12, Vol.22 (4), p.1-21
  • Description: Using CEO pension as inside debt, we show how inside debt affects cost stickiness. Inside debt was recently recognized as debt-based compensation that increases managers' risk aversion. More risk adverse managers will reduce cost stickiness if it suits their self-interest. We empirically find that inside debt decreases cost stickiness, which implies that cost stickiness is mainly driven by overconfident CEOs' intentions to benefit them. Our results show that inside debt can mitigate the agency problem in cost stickiness.
  • Publisher: Arden: Jordan Whitney Enterprises, Inc
  • Language: English
  • Identifier: ISSN: 1099-9264
    EISSN: 1939-4675
  • Source: AUTh Library subscriptions: ProQuest Central
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