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The Role of Overbilling in Hospitals’ Earnings Management Decisions

ISSN: 0963-8180 ;EISSN: 1468-4497 ;DOI: 10.1080/09638180.2017.1383168

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  • Nhan đề:
    The Role of Overbilling in Hospitals’ Earnings Management Decisions
  • Tác giả: Heese, Jonas
  • Chủ đề: Earnings Management
  • Mô tả: This paper examines the role of overbilling in hospitals’ earnings management choices. Overbilling by hospitals is a form of revenue manipulation that involves misclassifying a patient into a diagnosis-related group that yields higher reimbursement. As overbilling allows hospitals to increase revenues without altering operations, affecting costs, or having to reverse such behavior in the future, I propose and find that overbilling reduces hospitals’ use of managing accruals or cutting discretionary expenditures. Next, I find that hospital managers prefer overbilling to managing accruals (cutting discretionary expenditures) when cutting discretionary expenditures (managing accruals) is constrained and vice versa. Collectively, my findings suggest that overbilling is an important alternative manipulation tool in hospitals.
  • Nơi xuất bản: Informa UK Limited
  • Năm xuất bản: 2018
  • Ngôn ngữ: English
  • Số nhận dạng: ISSN: 0963-8180
    EISSN: 1468-4497
    DOI: 10.1080/09638180.2017.1383168
  • Nguồn: Harvard University Library DASH

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