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THE EFFECT OF DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS LIABILITY INSURANCE ON EARNINGS MANAGEMENT BEHAVIOR OF MANAGERS

Academia economic papers, 2014-09, Vol.42 (3), p.331 [Peer Reviewed Journal]

Copyright Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica Sep 2014 ;ISSN: 1018-161X ;EISSN: 1810-4851

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  • Title:
    THE EFFECT OF DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS LIABILITY INSURANCE ON EARNINGS MANAGEMENT BEHAVIOR OF MANAGERS
  • Author: Tang, Li-Fen ; Liao, Hsiumei ; Lee, Jan-Zan
  • Subjects: Accruals ; Directors & officers insurance ; Earnings management ; Liability insurance ; Managers ; Studies
  • Is Part Of: Academia economic papers, 2014-09, Vol.42 (3), p.331
  • Description: Using publicly-available D&O insurance data for public companies in Taiwan from 2008 to 2010, this study examines the effects of directors and officers liability insurance (D&O insurance hereafter) on earnings management behavior of managers. The empirical results show that firms with D&O insurance have greater magnitude of discretionary accruals than those without D&O insurance. In addition, we also find that firms with higher abnormal D&O insurance coverage have greater magnitude of discretionary accruals. Furthermore, we find that there exists a positive relationship between D&O insurance and discretionary accruals in firms managing earnings upward. However, we find no significant evidence on the above-mentioned relationship for firms managing earnings downward.
  • Publisher: Taipei: Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica
  • Language: Chinese;English
  • Identifier: ISSN: 1018-161X
    EISSN: 1810-4851
  • Source: Alma/SFX Local Collection
    ProQuest Central

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