Ngôn ngữ:

Corporate governance and shareholder initiatives: Empirical evidence

Journal of financial economics, 1996-11, Vol.42 (3), p.365-395 [Tạp chí có phản biện]

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Nhan đề:
Corporate governance and shareholder initiatives: Empirical evidence
Tác giả: Karpoff, Jonathan M. ; Malatesta, Paul H. ; Walkling, Ralph A.
Chủ đề: Company management ; Corporate governance ; Corporatism ; Financial economics ; Proxy ; Proxy solicitation ; Shareholder initiatives ; Shareholder relations ; Shareholder voting ; Statistical analysis ; Stock prices ; Stockholders ; Studies
Là 1 phần của: Journal of financial economics, 1996-11, Vol.42 (3), p.365-395
Mô tả: Shareholder-initiated proxy proposals on corporate governance issues became popular in the late 1980s as corporate takeover activity declined. We find firms attracting governance proposals have poor prior performance, as measured by the market-to-book ratio, operating return, and sales growth. There is little evidence that operating returns improve after proposals. The proposals also have negligible effects on company share values and top management turnover. Even proposals that receive a majority of shareholder votes typically do not engender share price increases or discernible changes in firm policies.
Nơi xuất bản: Amsterdam: Elsevier B.V
Ngôn ngữ: English
Số nhận dạng: ISSN: 0304-405X
EISSN: 1879-2774
DOI: 10.1016/0304-405X(96)00883-5
CODEN: JFECDT
Nguồn: Alma/SFX Local Collection
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