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VIII—Propositions and Cognitive Relations

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 2019-07, Vol.119 (2), p.157-178 [Peer Reviewed Journal]

COPYRIGHT 2019 Oxford University Press ;2019 The Aristotelian Society ;ISSN: 0066-7374 ;EISSN: 1467-9264 ;DOI: 10.1093/arisoc/aoz013

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  • Title:
    VIII—Propositions and Cognitive Relations
  • Author: Jones, Nicholas K
  • Subjects: Natural language
  • Is Part Of: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 2019-07, Vol.119 (2), p.157-178
  • Description: Abstract There are two broad approaches to theorizing about ontological categories. Quineans use first-order quantifiers to generalize over entities of each category, whereas type theorists use quantification on variables of different semantic types to generalize over different categories. Does anything of import turn on the difference between these approaches? If so, are there good reasons to go type-theoretic? I argue for positive answers to both questions concerning the category of propositions. I also discuss two prominent arguments for a Quinean conception of propositions, concerning their role in natural language semantics and apparent quantification over propositions within natural language. It will emerge that even if these arguments are sound, there need be no deep question about Quinean propositions’ true nature, contrary to much recent work on the metaphysics of propositions.
  • Publisher: Oxford: Oxford University Press
  • Language: English
  • Identifier: ISSN: 0066-7374
    EISSN: 1467-9264
    DOI: 10.1093/arisoc/aoz013
  • Source: ProQuest Central

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