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Electoral Accountability and Corruption: Evidence from the Audits of Local Governments

The American economic review, 2011-06, Vol.101 (4), p.1274-1311 [Peer Reviewed Journal]

Copyright© 2011 American Economic Association ;Copyright American Economic Association Jun 2011 ;ISSN: 0002-8282 ;EISSN: 1944-7981 ;DOI: 10.1257/aer.101.4.1274 ;CODEN: AENRAA

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Title:
Electoral Accountability and Corruption: Evidence from the Audits of Local Governments
Author: Ferraz, Claudio ; Finan, Frederico
Subjects: Accountability ; Auditing ; Audits ; Brazil ; Corruption ; Corruption in government ; Economic theory ; Election law ; Election results ; Government corruption ; Hypotheses ; Incumbents ; Institutionalism ; Institutions ; Judicial corruption ; Local economy ; Local elections ; Local government ; Mayors ; Political corruption ; Political economy ; Political elections ; Political ethics ; Political parties ; Politicians ; Politics ; Population characteristics ; Public management ; Reelection ; Studies
Is Part Of: The American economic review, 2011-06, Vol.101 (4), p.1274-1311
Description: We show that political institutions affect corruption levels. We use audit reports in Brazil to construct new measures of political corruption in local governments and test whether electoral accountability affects the corruption practices of incumbent politicians. We find significantly less corruption in municipalities where mayors can get reelected. Mayors with reelection incentives misappropriate 27 percent fewer resources than mayors without reelection incentives. These effects are more pronounced among municipalities with less access to information and where the likelihood of judicial punishment is lower. Overall our findings suggest that electoral rules that enhance political accountability play a crucial role in constraining politician's corrupt behavior.
Publisher: Nashville: American Economic Association
Language: English
Identifier: ISSN: 0002-8282
EISSN: 1944-7981
DOI: 10.1257/aer.101.4.1274
CODEN: AENRAA
Source: ProQuest Central

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Electoral Accountability and Corruption: Evidence from the Audits of Local Governments

Copyright© 2011 American Economic Association ;Copyright American Economic Association Jun 2011 ;ISSN: 0002-8282 ;EISSN: 1944-7981 ;DOI: 10.1257/aer.101.4.1274 ;CODEN: AENRAA

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