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Is conservatism demanded by performance measurement in compensation contracts? Evidence from earnings measures used in bonus formulas

Review of accounting studies, 2024-03, Vol.29 (1), p.809-851 [Peer Reviewed Journal]

The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2022. Springer Nature or its licensor holds exclusive rights to this article under a publishing agreement with the author(s) or other rightsholder(s); author self-archiving of the accepted manuscript version of this article is solely governed by the terms of such publishing agreement and applicable law. ;ISSN: 1380-6653 ;EISSN: 1573-7136 ;DOI: 10.1007/s11142-022-09729-6

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  • Title:
    Is conservatism demanded by performance measurement in compensation contracts? Evidence from earnings measures used in bonus formulas
  • Author: Na, Ke ; Zhang, Ivy Xiying ; Zhang, Yong
  • Subjects: Accounting/Auditing ; Business and Management ; Corporate Finance ; Public Finance
  • Is Part Of: Review of accounting studies, 2024-03, Vol.29 (1), p.809-851
  • Description: We explore the informational properties of earnings that compensation contracting requires for performance measurement. While conditional conservatism could be desirable because it can help to alleviate agency conflicts, its downside relates to the trade-off between conservatism and other important properties, such as persistence. We infer boards’ performance measurement preferences from a novel dataset of earnings realizations used to calculate executive bonus payouts (which we label compensation earnings), which can be either GAAP or non-GAAP. On average, compensation earnings do not exhibit any conditional conservatism in the full sample. The lack of conservatism holds even in subsamples with strong corporate governance and subsamples with high ex ante agency costs, suggesting optimal contract design rather than opportunism. Finally, our analyses indicate that compensation earnings are more persistent and informative than GAAP earnings. Overall our results suggest that boards trade off conservatism for other properties in measuring performance for executive compensation.
  • Publisher: New York: Springer US
  • Language: English
  • Identifier: ISSN: 1380-6653
    EISSN: 1573-7136
    DOI: 10.1007/s11142-022-09729-6
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