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Slow to Anger and Fast to Forgive: Cooperation in an Uncertain World

The American economic review, 2012-04, Vol.102 (2), p.720-749 [Peer Reviewed Journal]

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Title:
Slow to Anger and Fast to Forgive: Cooperation in an Uncertain World
Author: Fudenberg, Drew ; Rand, David G. ; Dreber, Anna
Subjects: Cooperation ; Economic models ; Economic theory ; Economics ; Equilibrium ; Error rates ; Experimental games ; Forgiveness ; Game theory ; Games ; Maximum likelihood estimation ; Nash equilibrium ; Noise ; Prisoner's dilemma ; Prisoners dilemma ; Punishment ; Repeated games ; Repeated prisoners dilemma ; Studies
Is Part Of: The American economic review, 2012-04, Vol.102 (2), p.720-749
Description: We study the experimental play of the repeated prisoner's dilemma when intended actions are implemented with noise. In treatments where cooperation is an equilibrium, subjects cooperate substantially more than in treatments without cooperative equilibria. In all settings there was considerable strategic diversity, indicating that subjects had not fully learned the distribution of play. Furthermore, cooperative strategies yielded higher payoffs than uncooperative strategies in the treatments with cooperative equilibria. In these treatments successful strategies were "lenient" in not retaliating for the first defection, and many were "forgiving" in trying to return to cooperation after inflicting a punishment.
Publisher: Nashville: American Economic Association
Language: English
Identifier: ISSN: 0002-8282
EISSN: 1944-7981
DOI: 10.1257/aer.102.2.720
CODEN: AENRAA
Source: ProQuest Central

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