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Corporate Tax Payoff in A Game Theory Approach

Ege akademik bakıs, 2018-04, Vol.18 (2), p.195-215 [Peer Reviewed Journal]

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Title:
Corporate Tax Payoff in A Game Theory Approach
Author: Kiral, Erin ; Mavruk, Can
Subjects: Audits ; Corporate taxes ; Discount rates ; Game theory ; Payoffs ; Tax evasion ; Tax rates
Is Part Of: Ege akademik bakıs, 2018-04, Vol.18 (2), p.195-215
Description: This article investigates corporate tax payoffs in a repeated game theory approach. An application of mixed strategy infinitely repeated game for corporate tax payoffs is provided with four payment types included under new draft tax procedural law. The Folk Theorem is used to find SPNE of infinitely repeated game strategies. The results demonstrate that: (1) the solution set of zero sum game is linear and that of variable sum game is trapezoidal; (2) Grim-trigger and Tit-for-tat of defection both are not appropriate strategies; (3) in pure and mixed strategy equilibrium, TRA needs high audit rates in order to force CTP to point of indifference; (4) CTP will prefer evading tax indefinitely and if possible request settlement when get caught for evading tax; and (5) the number of qualified tax inspectors and audit rates must be increased to break the courage of CTP evading tax.
Publisher: Izmir: Ege University Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences
Language: Turkish
Identifier: ISSN: 1303-099X
DOI: 10.21121/eab.2018237350
Source: Alma/SFX Local Collection
ProQuest Central

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