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Inequality, communication, and the avoidance of disastrous climate change in a public goods game

Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences - PNAS, 2011-07, Vol.108 (29), p.11825-11829 [Peer Reviewed Journal]

copyright © 1993–2008 National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America ;Copyright National Academy of Sciences Jul 19, 2011 ;ISSN: 0027-8424 ;EISSN: 1091-6490 ;DOI: 10.1073/pnas.1102493108 ;PMID: 21730154

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Title:
Inequality, communication, and the avoidance of disastrous climate change in a public goods game
Author: Tavoni, Alessandro ; Dannenberg, Astrid ; Kallis, Giorgos ; Löschel, Andreas
Subjects: Climate change ; Climate change policy ; Communication ; Endowments ; Free rider effect ; Game Theory ; Games, Experimental ; Global climate models ; Global Warming - prevention & control ; Globalization ; Humans ; Income inequality ; Inequality ; International Cooperation ; International environmental cooperation ; Nash equilibrium ; Public good ; Public goods ; Return on investment ; Social Sciences ; Socioeconomic Factors ; Surveys and Questionnaires
Is Part Of: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences - PNAS, 2011-07, Vol.108 (29), p.11825-11829
Description: International efforts to provide global public goods often face the challenges of coordinating national contributions and distributing costs equitably in the face of uncertainty, inequality, and free-riding incentives. In an experimental setting, we distribute endowments unequally among a group of people who can reach a fixed target sum through successive money contributions, knowing that if they fail, they will lose all their remaining money with 50% probability. In some treatments, we give players the option to communicate intended contributions. We find that inequality reduces the prospects of reaching the target but that communication increases success dramatically. Successful groups tend to eliminate inequality over the course of the game, with rich players signaling willingness to redistribute early on. Our results suggest that coordination-promoting institutions and early redistribution from richer to poorer nations are both decisive for the avoidance of global calamities, such as disruptive climate change.
Publisher: United States: National Academy of Sciences
Language: English
Identifier: ISSN: 0027-8424
EISSN: 1091-6490
DOI: 10.1073/pnas.1102493108
PMID: 21730154
Source: GFMER Free Medical Journals
MEDLINE
PubMed Central

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Inequality, communication, and the avoidance of disastrous climate change in a public goods game

copyright © 1993–2008 National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America ;Copyright National Academy of Sciences Jul 19, 2011 ;ISSN: 0027-8424 ;EISSN: 1091-6490 ;DOI: 10.1073/pnas.1102493108 ;PMID: 21730154

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