skip to main content
Language:
Search Limited to: Search Limited to: Resource type Show Results with: Show Results with: Search type Index

Attacks on Java Card 3.0 Combining Fault and Logical Attacks

Smart Card Research and Advanced Application, 2010, Vol.6035, p.148-163 [Peer Reviewed Journal]

Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2010 ;Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License ;ISSN: 0302-9743 ;ISBN: 9783642125096 ;ISBN: 3642125093 ;EISSN: 1611-3349 ;EISBN: 9783642125102 ;EISBN: 3642125107 ;DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-12510-2_11

Digital Resources/Online E-Resources

Citations Cited by
  • Title:
    Attacks on Java Card 3.0 Combining Fault and Logical Attacks
  • Author: Barbu, Guillaume ; Thiebeauld, Hugues ; Guerin, Vincent
  • Subjects: Combined Attack ; Computer Science ; Cryptography and Security ; Fault Injection ; Java Card 3 ; Logical Attack
  • Is Part Of: Smart Card Research and Advanced Application, 2010, Vol.6035, p.148-163
  • Description: Java Cards have been threatened so far by attacks using ill-formed applications which assume that the application bytecode is not verified. This assumption remained realistic as long as the bytecode verifier was commonly executed off-card and could thus be bypassed. Nevertheless it can no longer be applied to the Java Card 3 Connected Edition context where the bytecode verification is necessarily performed on-card. Therefore Java Card 3 Connected Edition seems to be immune against this kind of attacks. In this paper, we demonstrate that running ill-formed application does not necessarily mean loading and installing ill-formed application. For that purpose, we introduce a brand new kind of attack which combines fault injection and logical tampering. By these means, we describe two case studies taking place in the new Java Card 3 context. The first one shows how ill-formed applications can still be introduced and executed despite the on-card bytecode verifier. The second example leads to the modification of any method already installed on the card into any malicious bytecode. Finally we successfully mount these attacks on a recent device, emphasizing the necessity of taking into account these new threats when implementing Java Card 3 features.
  • Publisher: Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
  • Language: English
  • Identifier: ISSN: 0302-9743
    ISBN: 9783642125096
    ISBN: 3642125093
    EISSN: 1611-3349
    EISBN: 9783642125102
    EISBN: 3642125107
    DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-12510-2_11
  • Source: Hyper Article en Ligne (HAL) (Open Access)

Searching Remote Databases, Please Wait