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CSR-Contingent Executive Compensation Incentive and Earnings Management

Sustainability, 2019, Vol.11 (12), p.3421 [Peer Reviewed Journal]

2019. This work is licensed under https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ (the “License”). Notwithstanding the ProQuest Terms and Conditions, you may use this content in accordance with the terms of the License. ;ISSN: 2071-1050 ;EISSN: 2071-1050 ;DOI: 10.3390/su11123421

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  • Title:
    CSR-Contingent Executive Compensation Incentive and Earnings Management
  • Author: Li, Zhichuan (Frank) ; Thibodeau, Caleb
  • Subjects: Benchmarks ; Compensation ; Corporate governance ; Earnings ; Earnings management ; Executive compensation ; Liabilities ; Management ; Packages ; Social responsibility
  • Is Part Of: Sustainability, 2019, Vol.11 (12), p.3421
  • Description: This paper empirically studies the connection between earnings management and corporate social performance, conditional on the existence of CSR-contingent executive compensation contracts, an emerging practice to link executive compensation to corporate social performance. We find that executives are more likely to manipulate earnings to achieve their personal compensation goals when CSR rating is low, as well as their CSR-contingent compensation. Because of public pressure on their excessive total compensation, corporate executives see no need to manipulate earnings to increase compensation when their CSR-contingent compensation is already high. Our results suggest that earnings management and CSR-contingent compensation are substitute tools to serve the interests of executives, which is an agency problem that was never previously studied. Additionally, we explore how managerial characteristics affect earnings management, driven by the incentive effects of CSR-linked compensation.
  • Publisher: Basel: MDPI AG
  • Language: English
  • Identifier: ISSN: 2071-1050
    EISSN: 2071-1050
    DOI: 10.3390/su11123421
  • Source: Geneva Foundation Free Medical Journals at publisher websites
    AUTh Library subscriptions: ProQuest Central
    ROAD: Directory of Open Access Scholarly Resources

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