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Competition and incentives with motivated agents

The American economic review, 2005-06, Vol.95 (3), p.616-636 [Peer Reviewed Journal]

Copyright 1998-2005 American Economic Association ;Copyright American Economic Association Jun 2005 ;ISSN: 0002-8282 ;EISSN: 1944-7981 ;DOI: 10.1257/0002828054201413 ;CODEN: AENRAA

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Title:
Competition and incentives with motivated agents
Author: Besley, Timothy ; Ghatak, Maitreesh
Subjects: Allgemein bildende Schule ; Bureaucracy ; Competition ; Economic behaviour ; Economic competition ; Economic incentives ; Economic models ; Economic motivation ; Educational incentives ; Government bureaucracy ; Incentive pay ; Individual behaviour ; Institution ; Market economy ; Microeconomics ; Motivation ; Non-profit organizations ; Nonprofit organizations ; Organisationswandel ; Organization theory ; Principal-agent theory ; Private sector ; Productivity ; Public sector ; School principals ; Strategic management ; Studies ; Unternehmenskultur ; Wettbewerb ; Wirtschaftlichkeit ; Öffentlicher Sektor
Is Part Of: The American economic review, 2005-06, Vol.95 (3), p.616-636
Description: A unifying theme in the literature on organizations such as public bureaucracies and private nonprofits is the importance of mission, as opposed to profit, as an organizational goal. Such mission-oriented organizations are frequently staffed by motivated agents who subscribe to the mission. This paper studies incentives in such contexts and emphasizes the role of matching the mission preferences of principals and agents in increasing organizational efficiency. Matching economizes on the need for high-powered incentives. It can also, however, entrench bureaucratic conservatism and resistance to innovations. The framework developed in this paper is applied to school competition, incentives in the public sector and in private nonprofits, and the interdependence of incentives and productivity between the private for-profit sector and the mission-oriented sector through occupational choice.
Publisher: Nashville: American Economic Association
Language: English
Identifier: ISSN: 0002-8282
EISSN: 1944-7981
DOI: 10.1257/0002828054201413
CODEN: AENRAA
Source: ProQuest Central

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Competition and incentives with motivated agents

Copyright 1998-2005 American Economic Association ;Copyright American Economic Association Jun 2005 ;ISSN: 0002-8282 ;EISSN: 1944-7981 ;DOI: 10.1257/0002828054201413 ;CODEN: AENRAA

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