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CAPEX Bias and Adverse Incentives in Incentive Regulation

Discussion papers (International Transport Forum), 2019-08, p.1-78

Copyright Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Aug 5, 2019 ;EISSN: 2223-439X

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  • Title:
    CAPEX Bias and Adverse Incentives in Incentive Regulation
  • Author: Smith, Andrew ; Wheat, Phill ; Thiebaud, Jean-Christophe ; Stead, Alex
  • Subjects: Abbreviations ; Bias ; Capital expenditures ; Cost analysis ; Cost control ; Data envelopment analysis ; Economics ; Financing ; Incentives ; Infrastructure ; International ; Investment strategy ; Markets ; Operations research ; Performance management ; Pricing ; Productivity ; Project management ; Public private partnerships ; Regulation ; Roads & highways ; Switches ; Transportation planning ; Working groups
  • Is Part Of: Discussion papers (International Transport Forum), 2019-08, p.1-78
  • Description: The group, which assembled renowned practitioners and academics from areas including private infrastructure finance, incentive regulation, civil engineering, project management and transport policy, examined how to address the problem of uncertainty in contracts with a view to mobilise more private investment in transport infrastructure. [...]the authors would like to acknowledge the comments made by all the members of the Working Group on the presentations given in relation to this work. Acronyms and abbreviations A-J effect Averch-Johnson effect BOTEX TOTEX less enhancements expenditure CAPEX Company capital expenditure CMA Competition and Markets Authority CP (Regulatory) Control Period (e.g. CP4) CQC Cost-Quality-Customer CIS Capital incentive scheme DEA Data Envelopment Analysis DfT Department for Transport (UK) HLOS High Level Output Specification HMEP Highways Maintenance Efficiency Programme LHAs Local Highway Authorities LHN Local Highway Network LRIC Long-run incremental cost MFPVS Marginal future saving in present value terms M&R Maintenance and renewal MUFC Marginal up-front cost NPIF National Productivity Investment Fund ODIs Outcome delivery incentives OFGEM Office of Gas and Electricity markets (energy regulator, UK) OFWAT Office for Water Services (economic regulator of the water sector in England and Wales) OPEX Company operating expenditure ORR Office of Rail and Road (formerly Office of Rail Regulation) PAYG Pay-as-you-go PCs Performance commitments PPP Public-Private Partnership PR Periodic Review (e.g. PR14 is the Periodic Review in 2014) RAB Regulatory asset base RCM Revenue correction mechanism RCV Regulated Capital Value RISs Road Investment Strategies RMMS Rail Market Monitoring Survey RPI-X Retail prices index (RPI) - X (productivity factor) S&Cs Switches and Crossings SOFA Statement of Funds Available SRN Strategic Roads Network TOEX Measure of company total cash costs (operating expenditure, including maintenance, plus capital expenditure (renewals and enhancements) UIC International Union of Railways WACC Weighted average cost of capital WaSCs Water and sewage companies in England and Wales WOCs Water only companies in England and Wales Executive summary What we did This paper addresses the question of to what extent benchmarking XXX can deliver YYY. The first is that there may be a capital bias in rate of return regulation systems (the Averch-Johnson 1962 effect) where the allowed rate of return is greater than the cost of capital.
  • Publisher: Paris: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
  • Language: English
  • Identifier: EISSN: 2223-439X
  • Source: ProQuest Central
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