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Earnings Management and Status of Corporate Governance under Different Levels of Corruption—An Empirical Analysis in European Countries

Journal of risk and financial management, 2023-10, Vol.16 (10), p.458 [Peer Reviewed Journal]

COPYRIGHT 2023 MDPI AG ;2023 by the author. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). Notwithstanding the ProQuest Terms and Conditions, you may use this content in accordance with the terms of the License. ;ISSN: 1911-8074 ;ISSN: 1911-8066 ;EISSN: 1911-8074 ;DOI: 10.3390/jrfm16100458

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  • Title:
    Earnings Management and Status of Corporate Governance under Different Levels of Corruption—An Empirical Analysis in European Countries
  • Author: Dokas, Ioannis
  • Subjects: Accounting ; Behavior ; Boards of directors ; Chairman of the board ; Chairpersons ; Collaboration ; Corporate governance ; Corruption ; Earnings management ; Financial reporting ; Financial statements ; Influence ; Meetings ; Production costs ; Profits ; Stockholders
  • Is Part Of: Journal of risk and financial management, 2023-10, Vol.16 (10), p.458
  • Description: This study investigates the effect of the characteristics of the board of directors on the accrual and real earnings management level, focusing on the role of the corruption level. The employed dataset consists of 469 European-listed firms from 2011 to 2019. Using a fixed-effect panel data regression model, the results documented that larger boards lack coordination and communication in less corrupt economies, facilitating earnings manipulation through accruals and sales. In highly corrupt countries, oversized boards are associated with increased manipulation of production costs and discretionary expenses. Board meetings are positively related to accrual and sales manipulation in low-corruption countries, and board independence leads to reducing discretionary expenses regardless of corruption level. Board tenure negatively affects accruals and discretionary expenses but tends to increase manipulation through production costs in low-corruption contexts. Additionally, when the CEO serves as the board chairman, it encourages the manipulation of discretionary expenses while reducing real earnings manipulation through sales and production costs. In aggregate, the level of corruption can influence a board’s effectiveness under specific conditions.
  • Publisher: Basel: MDPI AG
  • Language: English
  • Identifier: ISSN: 1911-8074
    ISSN: 1911-8066
    EISSN: 1911-8074
    DOI: 10.3390/jrfm16100458
  • Source: Coronavirus Research Database
    ProQuest Central
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