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Analyst Promotions within Credit Rating Agencies: Accuracy or Bias?

Journal of financial and quantitative analysis, 2020-05, Vol.55 (3), p.869-896 [Peer Reviewed Journal]

Copyright University of Washington, School of Business Administration May 2020 ;Copyright © Michael G. Foster School of Business, University of Washington 2019 ;ISSN: 0022-1090 ;EISSN: 1756-6916 ;DOI: 10.1017/S0022109019000243

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  • Title:
    Analyst Promotions within Credit Rating Agencies: Accuracy or Bias?
  • Author: Kisgen, Darren J ; Nickerson, Jordan ; Osborn, Matthew ; Reuter, Jonathan
  • Subjects: Accuracy ; Analysts ; Bias ; Bond ratings ; Corporate debt ; Credit ; Credit ratings ; Desire ; Labor market ; Rating services ; Ratings & rankings ; Reliability
  • Is Part Of: Journal of financial and quantitative analysis, 2020-05, Vol.55 (3), p.869-896
  • Description: We estimate Moody’s preference for accurate versus biased ratings using hand-collected data on the internal labor market outcomes of its analysts. We find that accurate analysts are more likely to be promoted and less likely to depart. The opposite is true for analysts who downgrade more frequently, who assign ratings below those predicted by a ratings model, and whose downgrades are associated with large negative market reactions. Downgraded firms are also more likely to be assigned a new analyst. These patterns are consistent with Moody’s balancing its desire for accuracy against its corporate clients’ desire for higher ratings.
  • Publisher: Seattle: Cambridge University Press
  • Language: English
  • Identifier: ISSN: 0022-1090
    EISSN: 1756-6916
    DOI: 10.1017/S0022109019000243
  • Source: ProQuest Central

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