skip to main content
Language:
Search Limited to: Search Limited to: Resource type Show Results with: Show Results with: Search type Index

Research on the Pollutant Emission Reduction Strategy and Simulation of Paper-Making Enterprises under the Reward and Punishment Mechanism

Discrete dynamics in nature and society, 2021-10, Vol.2021, p.1-17 [Peer Reviewed Journal]

Copyright © 2021 Sen Zhang et al. ;COPYRIGHT 2021 Hindawi Limited ;Copyright © 2021 Sen Zhang et al. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License (the “License”), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. Notwithstanding the ProQuest Terms and Conditions, you may use this content in accordance with the terms of the License. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 ;ISSN: 1026-0226 ;EISSN: 1607-887X ;DOI: 10.1155/2021/9402940

Full text available

Citations Cited by
  • Title:
    Research on the Pollutant Emission Reduction Strategy and Simulation of Paper-Making Enterprises under the Reward and Punishment Mechanism
  • Author: Zhang, Sen ; Qin, Guangyuan ; Xie, Yifan ; Tian, Yuan ; Shi, Liyuan ; Cheng, Baodong
  • De la Sen, Manuel ; Manuel De la Sen
  • Subjects: Air pollution ; Cooperation ; Discharge ; Emission analysis ; Emissions ; Emissions control ; Emotions ; Environmental regulations ; Game theory ; Government ; Literature reviews ; Papermaking ; Political aspects ; Pollutants ; Pollution ; Pollution control ; Simulation ; Supervision ; Sustainable development
  • Is Part Of: Discrete dynamics in nature and society, 2021-10, Vol.2021, p.1-17
  • Description: Environmental pollution has become an important obstacle on the path of ecological civilization construction, and it is urgent to control environmental pollution. By establishing an evolutionary game model, this thesis focuses on analyzing how paper-making enterprises choose their own emission reduction strategies under the reward and punishment mechanism. It further analyzes how social welfare changes under the reward and punishment mechanism, and finally through simulation research, this thesis analyzes the evolutionary paths of paper-making enterprises’ pollution emission strategies under the reward and punishment mechanism. The results of the reward and punishment mechanism are as follows: under the static reward and punishment mechanism, the game system will repeatedly oscillate around a point. There is no stable equilibrium point at this time. However, under the dynamic reward and punishment mechanism, the game system will tend to a stable equilibrium point. The results of social welfare analysis show that high-intensity rewards will reduce the amount of pollution discharged by paper-making enterprises, thereby maximizing social welfare. On the contrary, when paper-making enterprises discharge a large amount of pollution, they will be subject to high-intensity penalties. When facing high-intensity punishments, paper-making enterprises will tend to not to discharge. So social welfare is also maximized. The simulation research results show that reasonable punishment strategies are more effective than reward ones. Based on this, the author proposes countermeasures, such as establishing a reasonable reward and punishment mechanism, reasonably determining the reward and punishment intensity for polluting enterprises. The emission reduction strategies of paper-making enterprises will be affected by the government’s reward and punishment mechanism. A deep study of its internal mechanism is not only of great significance for pollution control but also of great significance for the development of a green economy.
  • Publisher: New York: Hindawi
  • Language: English
  • Identifier: ISSN: 1026-0226
    EISSN: 1607-887X
    DOI: 10.1155/2021/9402940
  • Source: Directory of Open Access Journals
    ProQuest Central
Back to results list
INSPIRE LIBRARY - TON DUC THANG UNIVERSITY (84-028) 37 755 057 Feedback
19 Nguyen Huu Tho St. Dist.7, HCM thuvien@tdtu.edu.vn

Copyright © 2017 INSPIRE LIBRARY - TON DUC THANG UNIVERSITY

Searching Remote Databases, Please Wait