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Incentives, Selection, and Teacher Performance: Evidence from IMPACT

Journal of policy analysis and management, 2015-03, Vol.34 (2), p.267-297 [Peer Reviewed Journal]

Copyright © 2015 Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management ;2015 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management ;Copyright Wiley Periodicals Inc. Spring 2015 ;ISSN: 0276-8739 ;EISSN: 1520-6688 ;DOI: 10.1002/pam.21818 ;CODEN: JPAMD7

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Title:
Incentives, Selection, and Teacher Performance: Evidence from IMPACT
Author: Dee, Thomas S. ; Wyckoff, James
Subjects: Attrition ; Comparative Analysis ; Comparative studies ; Deviation ; District of Columbia ; Financial incentives ; Incentives ; Monetary incentives ; Pay for performance ; Public School Teachers ; Public Schools ; Rating ; Regression (Statistics) ; Regression analysis ; Schools ; Teacher Effectiveness ; Teacher Evaluation ; Teacher evaluations ; Teacher Persistence ; Teacher retention ; Teachers ; Threat ; Threats ; U.S.A ; United States ; United States of America ; Urban Schools ; Washington, D.C
Is Part Of: Journal of policy analysis and management, 2015-03, Vol.34 (2), p.267-297
Description: Teachers in the United States are compensated largely on the basis of fixed schedules that reward experience and credentials. However, there is a growing interest in whether performance-based incentives based on rigorous teacher evaluations can improve teacher retention and performance. The evidence available to date has been mixed at best. This study presents novel evidence on this topic based on IMPACT, the controversial teacher-evaluation system introduced in the District of Columbia Public Schools by then-Chancellor Michelle Rhee. IMPACT implemented uniquely highpowered incentives linked to multiple measures of teacher performance (i.e., several structured observational measures as well as test performance). We present regressiondiscontinuity (RD) estimates that compare the retention and performance outcomes among low-performing teachers whose ratings placed them near the threshold that implied a strong dismissal threat. We also compare outcomes among high-performing teachers whose rating placed them near a threshold that implied an unusually large financial incentive. Our RD results indicate that dismissal threats increased the voluntary attrition of low-performing teachers by 11 percentage points (i.e., more than 50 percent) and improved the performance of teachers who remained by 0.27 of a teacher-level standard deviation. We also find evidence that financial incentives further improved the performance of high-performing teachers (effect size = 0.24). © 2015 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.
Publisher: Hoboken: Blackwell Publishing Ltd
Language: English
Identifier: ISSN: 0276-8739
EISSN: 1520-6688
DOI: 10.1002/pam.21818
CODEN: JPAMD7
Source: Education Resources Information Center (ERIC)
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Incentives, Selection, and Teacher Performance: Evidence from IMPACT

Copyright © 2015 Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management ;2015 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management ;Copyright Wiley Periodicals Inc. Spring 2015 ;ISSN: 0276-8739 ;EISSN: 1520-6688 ;DOI: 10.1002/pam.21818 ;CODEN: JPAMD7

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