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No Taxation without Information: Deterrence and Self-Enforcement in the Value Added Tax

The American economic review, 2015-08, Vol.105 (8), p.2539-2569 [Peer Reviewed Journal]

Copyright© 2015 American Economic Association ;Copyright American Economic Association Aug 2015 ;ISSN: 0002-8282 ;EISSN: 1944-7981 ;DOI: 10.1257/aer.20130393 ;CODEN: AENRAA

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  • Title:
    No Taxation without Information: Deterrence and Self-Enforcement in the Value Added Tax
  • Author: Pomeranz, Dina
  • Subjects: Audit trails ; Audits ; Control groups ; Cost of sales ; Developing countries ; Enforcement ; Experiments ; Income taxes ; Informal economy ; LDCs ; Sales taxes ; Tax audits ; Tax evasion ; Tax payments ; Taxation ; Third party ; Value added ; Value added taxes ; VAT
  • Is Part Of: The American economic review, 2015-08, Vol.105 (8), p.2539-2569
  • Description: Claims that the VAT facilitates tax enforcement by generating paper trails on transactions between firms contributed to widespread VAT adoption worldwide, but there is surprisingly little evidence. This paper analyzes the role of third-party information for VAT enforcement through two randomized experiments among over 400,000 Chilean firms. Announcing additional monitoring has less impact on transactions that are subject to a paper trail, indicating the paper trail's preventive deterrence effect. This leads to strong enforcement spillovers up the VAT chain. These findings confirm that when taking evasion into account, significant differences emerge between otherwise equivalent forms of taxation.
  • Publisher: Nashville: American Economic Association
  • Language: English
  • Identifier: ISSN: 0002-8282
    EISSN: 1944-7981
    DOI: 10.1257/aer.20130393
    CODEN: AENRAA
  • Source: ProQuest Databases

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