skip to main content
Language:
Search Limited to: Search Limited to: Resource type Show Results with: Show Results with: Search type Index

The market for conservation and other hostages

Journal of economic theory, 2016-11 [Peer Reviewed Journal]

info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess ;ISSN: 0022-0531 ;EISSN: 1095-7235 ;DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2016.07.003

Digital Resources/Online E-Resources

Citations Cited by
  • Title:
    The market for conservation and other hostages
  • Author: Harstad, Bård Gjul
  • Is Part Of: Journal of economic theory, 2016-11
  • Description: A “conservation good” (such as a tropical forest) is owned by a seller who is tempted to consume (or cut), but a buyer benefits more from conservation. The seller prefers to conserve if the buyer is expected to buy, but the buyer is unwilling to pay as long as the seller conserves. This contradiction implies that the market for conservation cannot be efficient and conservation is likely to fail. A leasing market is inefficient for similar reasons and dominates the sales market if and only if the consumption value and the buyer's protection cost are large. The theory thus explains why optimal conservation often fails and why conservation abroad is leased, while domestic conservation is bought.
  • Publisher: Academic Press
  • Language: Norwegian
  • Identifier: ISSN: 0022-0531
    EISSN: 1095-7235
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2016.07.003
  • Source: NORA Norwegian Open Research Archives
Back to results list
INSPIRE LIBRARY - TON DUC THANG UNIVERSITY (84-028) 37 755 057 Feedback
19 Nguyen Huu Tho St. Dist.7, HCM thuvien@tdtu.edu.vn

Copyright © 2017 INSPIRE LIBRARY - TON DUC THANG UNIVERSITY

Searching Remote Databases, Please Wait