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Corporate boards, audit committees and voluntary disclosure: evidence from Italian Listed Companies

Journal of management and governance, 2013-02, Vol.17 (1), p.187-216 [Peer Reviewed Journal]

Springer Science+Business Media, LLC. 2011 ;Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013 ;ISSN: 1385-3457 ;EISSN: 1572-963X ;DOI: 10.1007/s10997-011-9168-3

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  • Title:
    Corporate boards, audit committees and voluntary disclosure: evidence from Italian Listed Companies
  • Author: Allegrini, Marco ; Greco, Giulio
  • Subjects: Accounting/Auditing ; Annual reports ; Audits ; Boards of directors ; Business and Management ; Committees ; Corporate governance ; Disclosure ; Empirical research ; Evidence ; Exploitation ; Industrial Organization ; Investments ; Management ; Management theory ; Nominations ; Ownership ; Risk management ; Securities markets ; Sociology ; Statistical analysis ; Stock exchanges ; Stockholders ; Strategic management ; Studies
  • Is Part Of: Journal of management and governance, 2013-02, Vol.17 (1), p.187-216
  • Description: This paper investigates the interplay between governance and disclosure in an agency setting, featured by concentrated ownership and high insider shareholders representation in the board. In this context, agency conflicts happen between large controlling shareholders and minority outside investors, with risks of private benefits exploitation. We regressed a voluntary disclosure index on seven governance variables related either to the board structure and functioning. The empirical evidence is provided by the Italian stock market. Our results suggest the presence of a complementary relationship between governance and disclosure. Diligent monitoring activity is associated with greater transparency to the outside. The findings are consistent with the view that internal and external control tend to be present at the same time, since the presence of one of them reduces the incentive for the controlling shareholders to limit the other. The empirical evidence also show that larger boards are not detrimental to outside shareholders, with regard to voluntary disclosure. The study can contribute to the understanding of the relationship between governance and disclosure in a particular agency setting. They might be of interest to practitioners and regulators, insofar as they are consistent with calls for more disclosure requirements in this agency setting.
  • Publisher: Boston: Springer US
  • Language: English
  • Identifier: ISSN: 1385-3457
    EISSN: 1572-963X
    DOI: 10.1007/s10997-011-9168-3
  • Source: Alma/SFX Local Collection
    ProQuest Central
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