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International Bureaucrats and the Formation of Intergovernmental Organizations: Institutional Design Discretion Sweetens the Pot

International organization, 2014, Vol.68 (1), p.177-209 [Peer Reviewed Journal]

Copyright © The IO Foundation 2014 ;2014 The IO Foundation ;ISSN: 0020-8183 ;EISSN: 1531-5088 ;DOI: 10.1017/S0020818313000349 ;CODEN: IOCMFZ

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Title:
International Bureaucrats and the Formation of Intergovernmental Organizations: Institutional Design Discretion Sweetens the Pot
Author: Johnson, Tana ; Urpelainen, Johannes
Subjects: Acquired immune deficiency syndrome ; AIDS ; Bureaucracy ; Bureaucrats ; Conservatism ; Cooperation ; Corporate bureaucracy ; Delegation ; Design ; Discretion ; Government bureaucracy ; Grants ; HIV ; Human immunodeficiency virus ; Institutionalism ; Intellectuals ; Intergovernmental organizations ; International cooperation ; International organizations ; International political organizations ; Organizations ; Pandemics ; Politics ; Preferences ; Principal-Agent Models ; Principal-agent theory ; State ; Studies ; Unilateralism
Is Part Of: International organization, 2014, Vol.68 (1), p.177-209
Description: Bureaucrats working in international intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) regularly help states design new IGOs. Sometimes international bureaucrats possess limited discretion in institutional design; sometimes, they enjoy broad discretion. In fact, they gain discretion even when they openly oppose state preferences. This contravenes conventional thinking about delegation: discretion should decrease as preference divergence between states and international bureaucrats increases. We develop a principal-agent theory of how much discretion states grant to international bureaucrats in the design of new IGOs. This is novel: while principal-agent theories of international delegation are common, scholars have not analyzed principal-agent relationships in the creation of new IGOs. We argue that even an international bureaucracy that disagrees with states' design preferences may enjoy substantial design leeway, because of states' need for bureaucratic expertise. In developing this argument, we employ a formal principal-agent model, case studies, and an original data set.
Publisher: New York, USA: Cambridge University Press
Language: English
Identifier: ISSN: 0020-8183
EISSN: 1531-5088
DOI: 10.1017/S0020818313000349
CODEN: IOCMFZ
Source: ProQuest Central

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International Bureaucrats and the Formation of Intergovernmental Organizations: Institutional Design Discretion Sweetens the Pot

Copyright © The IO Foundation 2014 ;2014 The IO Foundation ;ISSN: 0020-8183 ;EISSN: 1531-5088 ;DOI: 10.1017/S0020818313000349 ;CODEN: IOCMFZ

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